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New Dispensation for Civil Religion
Abstract
Ever since Robert Bellah introduced the term "civil religion" in the late 1960s to describe the transcendent
communal impulses of patriotic rituals and speeches, American scholars have debated its existence and
place in our national life. Despite the pointed suggestion of the label most scholars who use the term
"civil religion" have backed away, often emphatically, from calling it a "true" religion. This includes Rod
Hart, who portrays civil religion as explicitly rhetorical in his 1977 book The Political Pulpit. In one of the
periodic reconsiderations that Bellah's notion has occasioned, Hart joins in viewing civil religion as the
poor and ineffectual pretender to religion it has been seen as by most of its commentators.

This book chapter is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/129

ChapterS
A New Scholarly Dispensation for Civil Religion
Carolyn Marvin

Ever since Robert Bellah introduced the term "civil religion" in the late 1960s to
describe the transcendent communal impulses of patriotic rituals and speeches,
American scholars have debated its existence and place in our national life.! Despite the pointed suggestion of the labeL most scholars who use the term "civil
religion" have backed away, often emphatically, from calling it a ''true'' religion.
This includes Rod Hart, who portrays civil religion as explicitly rhetorical in his
1977 book The Political Pulpit. 2 In one of the periodic reconsiderations that Bellah's notion has occasioned, Hart joins in viewing civil religion as the poor and
ineffectual pretender to religion it has been seen as by most of its commentators.
There are other views. Following the GulfWar, David W. Ingle and I argued
for a bolder concept of civil religion. 3 We argued that nationalism, patriotism, or
civil religion-all descriptors ofthe same thing-is religion through and through.
In fact, civil religion may be the most authentic religion in the modem West. In
the wake of events of9/11, it may be time to look at these arguments again.
Whatever the status of civil religion, religion as a category of human endeavor is never gestureless rhetoric cast adrift from human actions. It is a system
of lived engagement grounded in the most profoundly meaningful of actsoffering up the real lives of true believers to secure the moral and physical survival of the group. Religion is what Jesus did on the cross, what holy warriors
undertake for Islam. Religion is the bodhisattva renouncing his own salvation for
that ofothers.
I believe scholarly ambivalence about the status ofcivil religion turns less on
the adequacy of notions of civil religion than on Americans' historically conditioned experience of religion, the model that underlies our understanding of civil
religion. At this historical moment, American denominational faiths occupy a
morally diminished historical status. Designed to separate national from sectarian
religious authority, disestablishment as constitutional doctrine weakened u.s.
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denominational faiths at their core by depriving them of authority to command
the sacrifice oftheir followers' lives. Though it may seem disrespectful to say so,
I contend that contemporary American notions of religion are hard pressed, in
consequence, to project a compelling vision of sectarian faith as the source and
guarantor ofgroup life.
It is no surprise that scholarship in the Bellah mold fashions u.s. civil religion as a pale echo of already pale denominational faiths. By describing denominational religion as pale, I mean it acquiesces in its state-mandated role of offering little more than a carefully contained system of polite ethics. I will argue that
a rhetorically focused conception ofcivil religion follows quite comfortably from
denominational religion's self-conscious retreat from life and death authority
over believers. As part of this aloofuess, denominational faith cultivates an aversion to violence that is at odds with religion historically considered. This is central to the practice of modern denominational faiths in the United States and
flows from the historical deference of denominational to civil faith as a system of
blood sacrifice.
If denominational religion is pale, U.S. civil religion is bright in American
life. It is expressed through an elaborate system of sacrificial and regenerative
beliefs, gestures, artifacts and words that bind citizens into a community ofmoral
obligation. Though aspects of this obligation are articulated in law, its spiritual
compellingness depends on the affective submission of citizens, their willingness
at any moment to be so bound.
Religion certainly has a rhetorical face. But if rhetoric were the essence of
religion, it would be hard to distinguish from advertising. Genuine religious expression is always connected to real stakes of death and sacrifice. These invest
religious rhetoric with truth and moral authority. Gestures of life and death are
primary in religion; rhetoric is secondary.
Two conditions are especially important for generating and sustaining the religious impulse. One is that the survival of enduring groups depends on the willing and, if necessary, coerced expenditure of members' blood and treasure
(though acknowledgements of coerced sacrifice always signal a crisis of faith).
The second is that death, the most serious threat to group existence, is mostly
beyond our control. Religion is the search for the true source of killing power.
Surrendering to it, we hope, will secure its blessing or its mercy, or harness it
against other, illegitimate killing powers.
In the industrialized West nations take the decision to wage peace or war.
On the grand scale life seems secure or chaotic largely in concert with the fortunes of the nation to which we belong. For contemporary Western sensibilities,
legitimate, demonstrable authority to kill is claimed primarily on behalf of the
nation. The U.S. looks with horror on those who attack it while claiming God for
authority. Though our own killing often makes an ally of God, it is ultimately
justified by appeals to national authority. This is so despite the strong connection
of American culture to sectarian traditions from which it has historically wrested
the power to enforce ultimate truth on the bodies of believers. Relations between
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civil religion and its sectarian adversaries or allies do fluctuate. Civil religion
may amplify, compete, or cooperate with sectarian religion. It may do all these
things at once. If truth in any culture is very simply what is worth dying for, the
crucial point is that civil religion is the dominant partner in any contest between
national and sectarian power. At least, this is the case wherever the group as a
whole grants the nation the final power to decide which citizens will be sacrificed
and when. To sustain itself as the embodiment of unassailable truth, the nation
calls for citizen sacrifice. The discourses that support this claim may fairly be
called religious rhetoric, but their moral authenticity rests on a foundation of past
blood offerings. These are enlisted to create a willingness to offer more blood in
the future.
Where citizen bodies are not fully committed, rhetoric may well be in play
but not religion, since the most moving rhetoric cannot hold a society together on
its own. Societies are held together by believers who so agree on what is fundamental (namely, who has the right to sacrifice group members) that they will
offer their own lives and their children's to defend it. To this end the nation cultivates a sacrificial class tasked to lay down its lives whenever group killing authority is in peril. This special class is the military, organized along lines familiar
to any monastic community. It patrols the physical and psychic borders of the
group and defends them with blood. (The home front brigade of this class consists of policemen and firemen. During the 9/11 crisis, which lacked significant
sacrifices of U.S. lives abroad, firemen and policemen played the most visible
and mythically compelling sacrificial roles.)
The abiding focus of civil religion, like that of religion generally, is death.
So understood, civil religion is no set of optional beliefs for its citizens. In moments ofcrisis, disloyalty to the national god is intolerable. The need for devotion
to the national purpose and its instruments is so compelling and immediate that
action may righteously be taken against those who fail to demonstrate sufficient
piety. More important is that the authority ofthe national god to dispense life and
death to believers is at stake. Threat therefore provides the crisis and justification
for the nation to sacrifice its own. Sacrificing citizen lives on behalf of the national god re-claims for the nation the sole prerogative to control the life and
death of its own members from false gods who challenge it. By this means the
national god reigns supreme.
Because their models of sectarian faith have been de-fanged and domesticated, scholars ofAmerican civil religion have underestimated its hold on believers. When denominational religion went head to head with nationalism beginning
roughly in the seventeenth century in Europe, denominational religion lost much
ofits power to command or inspire sacrifice. Disestablishment was the settlement
of that struggle in effect if not always in name. In consequence of this historical
process, denominational religion in the U.S. was constrained to avoid armed
challenge to the killing authority ofnational religion. Though it fights a rearguard
action for moral superiority by arguing that violence is never justified, it is expected to rally round, and usually does, when the national god asks for sacrifice.
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If less orthodox denominational offshoots occasionally venture forth from
their subordinate place to try and seize killing authority for themselves, as David
Koresh did in the 1993 Branch Davidian uprising, the national god stands ready to
demonstrate whose killing authority is supreme. Though denominational religion
retains elaborate rituals for commemorating the sacrifices that anchor its past, and
though on occasion it enters the political arena to cheer on or criticize civil religious practice, its claims on believers are subjunctive and metaphorical. Few in
the U.S. truly expect believers to give up their lives for the Methodists or the First
Church ofChrist.
Rendered weak, denominational religion allows national religion to exercise
unrivaled command of group hearts, minds, and bodies. Indeed, it has little choice.
Denominational religion is not so much protected by the state as carefully monitored to make sure it stays within the boundaries assigned to it. So constrained,
denominational religion may offer profound meaning to its own faithful. But it is so
inessential for the life ofsociety as a whole that it is a matter ofofficial indifference
whether or not people believe in it. Belief systems of such casual consequence are
not fully realized religions in the sense argued here, but simply among the available
options for U.S. citizens within the bubbling stew ofpluralism.
Denominational religion offers meaning, comfort and solace. These are not
small gifts. Nevertheless, contemporary U.S. sectarian faiths demand little from
their followers beyond piety and occasional volunteer efforts. Where religion
demands more, as democratic civil religion does, spiritual doubt is a constant
danger. Belief that demands the bodies of believers is serious business. It must be
vigilant against skepticism concerning the ends for which death is demanded.
Such skepticism is salutary and risky. It is salutary in providing a popular check
on the sacrificial demands claimed by leaders for the national god. Only causes
for which believers will actually sacrifice their children can be thoroughly prosecuted. This inhibits, if it never quite banishes, a level of adventurism that heedlessly spends blood and treasure. But such skepticism is also risky. Where groups
are unwilling to undertake critical sacrifices, their prospects for survival diminish.
The uneasy conviction that there are few causes for which U.S. citizens are
willing to shed their own blood demonstrates a classic dilemma ofempire. Historically, empires have failed to inspire the intense loyalty of national faiths
whose believers share a common language, land, and blood. Client or slave states
typically provide the blood that secures the borders of empire. Hesitation to offer
the faithful in defense of empire hints at a limit to spiritual commitment that will
sooner or later be tested by those who serve other gods. Nor can advanced technologies of communication and travel provide a cohesion that will match the
unifying intensity of blood ties. Indeed, technologies of distance are likely to
increase rather than reduce the scale of blood sacrifice in the long run. If
Clausewitzian total war has been necessary to generate a sacrificial scale adequate to tnbally bind the citizens of industrial nation-states, what will global
communities need to unify in their own defense? Empire builders facing the dissolution of communities made fragile by technological links operating in the
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absence of bodily intimacy may be tempted to call forth unity through sacrifice
amplified on a terrifying scale.
Whatever the future of American empire, American civil religion has been resilient within its national borders. Like other religions, it has seen periods of more
and less active belief and commitment Since World War II unified a generation,
devotion to US. civil religion has been manifest in short-lived bmsts of solidarity
engendered by presidential elections, the moon landing, the Gulf war and 9/11. It
has also been marked by periods of malaise and divisiveness. The most visible
class ofapostates in contemporary American civil religion is fOlmd among intellectuals. This is partly because current intellectual modes of analyzing culture are not
well equipped to recognize or credit genuine religion. The unfashionable master
narrative, for example, constitutes the heart ofreligious thinking.
Still, the discomfort of contemporary scholars with the idea that civil religion exists, or ought to, suggests more than the vagaries of intellectual fashion in
two important ways. The first is that intellectual authority proceeds from a textual
rather than bodily base. From this perspective modernity may be seen as a struggle between textual classes that preserve the bodies of their own members from
being used up for group survival by means of their skills in producing and manipulating texts, and body classes whose cultural value is the muscle-work they
perform, particularly in war. Textual authority conceals, even from the textual
classes, their dependence on and domination ofthe body classes who are required
to expend their blood in the service ofthe groUp.4
There is a more profound reason that scholars have failed to recognize or respect the religious intensity ofU.S. nationalism: namely, the official testimony of
patriotism that it is not religious at all. This is the claim of the U.S. Supreme
Court, the highest arbiter of the Constitution as the most sacred and foundational
American holy charter. In West Virginia State Board ofEducation v. Barnette,
(1943) the Court refused to make flag worship compulsory for schoolchildren by
granting a constitutional right not to say the Pledge of Allegiance. The first time
it faced the question of the pledge in Minersville School District v. Board ofEducation (1940), the Court ruled that schoolchildren could be compelled to say the
pledge. It recanted in Barnette, recognizing that compulsory flag worship explicitly equated civil religion with denominational faith. In twice deciding by the
narrowest possible majority (Texas v. Johnson, 1989; Eichmann v. United States,
1990) that citizens could legally bum the American flag, the Court barely refused
to establish a category of desecration that would render officially holy the central
artifact ofUS. civil religion.
Perhaps this refusal to confer official sanctity on U.S. civil religion is the
best evidence of its secular nature and a decisive challenge to the account of civil
religion I propose. Durkheim famously defined the sacred as what is kept apart
from the profane. He regarded this distinction as the bedrock of all social organization. By refusing to call itself sacred, civil religion cannily distances itself from
what is conventionally considered religious in US. life, though this conventional
faith makes no compelling claim on the lives of believers. By officially repudiat-
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ing its own religious status, civil religion protects the sanctity of the national god
by refusing to speak its real name. Thus it separates itself from proximate religious competitors. This is the deep structure of disestablishment. The national
god tolerates denominational gods if they agree not to demand believers' lives to
guarantee their own claims to truth. So long as custom confers the title ''religion''
on sectarian faith, civil religion has reason to distance itself To do othelWise
would cede moral equivalence to competitor gods. Meanwhile, the sanctity of
civil religion is gesturally manifest in ceremonial acts from naturalization to war.
Language, too, offers clues to the real situation. "God may show you mercy,"
said Sen. John McCain, ofOsama bin Laden's heretically monstrous challenge to
the killing authority of the United States, "We will not" ("Terrorist Attacks"). In
a moment of crisis, a sacrificial war hero asserts the respective killing authority
accorded to national and sectarian religion.
The frequent appearance of sectarian language in the ritual vocabulary ofnational appeals for God's favor and mercy also casts doubt on a religious account
ofpatriotism. Ifnational religion is paramount, why does it use the vocabulary of
sectarian religion at all? One answer is that U.S. civil religion inherits the rituals
and symbols of Christianity historically shared by the majority of its founders.
Denominational language invests civil religion with familiar religious forms.
Civil religion thus deploys a recognizable religious register while shielding itself
from challenge and unbelief. It is also true that conqueror religions often incorporate the indigenous faiths they dominate. As Catholic Spain absorbed the gods
the shrines and ceremonies of Aztecs and Incas in South America, American
nationalism incorporates and pacifies Christianity.
The religious status of patriotic ritual and belief has been challenged on the
grounds that it lacks cults of divine beings, organized churches and priesthoods or
their equivalent, and doctrinal explanations and consolations for death. In fact, these
elements figure prominently in U.S. civil religion. I have already discussed the
doctrine of sacrifice. The state and its officers constitute the church and priesthood
of the nation. In the broad sweep of religions, the expression of divine principle
takes different shapes. Some religions model it as a single personality with human
attributes; others (Roman Catholicism and the mystery religions of Greece, for
example) boast multiple divinities. Other traditions treat the divine principle as a
force immanent in nature or the universe. The divine principle ofAmerican nationalism is manifest in the nation and the flag. Mystically speaking, all citizens partake
of the flag, the holy corporate body, the most sacred artifact of U.S. civil religion.
As a non-material numinous entity, the flag encompasses all believers, living and
dead. Material flags also stand in for sacrificed citizens who are joined to it in the
role of supernatural, bloodthirsty guardians. In a group crisis these transformed but
watching dead call for the sacrifice of living generations. The sacrificial class is
ritually called to offer its blood to avenge and nourish previously sacrificed, now
divinely embodied, generations. The occasion that demands this response is the
sacrificial crisis described by Rene Girard. 5 Iffalse or competitor gods are permitted to challenge with impunity the nation that presides over life and death, the na-
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tion as divine principle may not be all-powerful or worthy of obedience. The sacrifi.cial blood ofbelievers removes this threat and restores its power.
Debates about the existence and value of civil religion are especially compelling to those who engage them from the perspective of professing one or another sectarian allegiance. Civil religion may then be cast as earnest but secondrate---not, after all, impressive compared to earlier religious traditions. Seen in
this light, American civil religion may appear theologically shallow and ignobly
chauvinistic compared to denominational faiths. The usual conclusion is that in
its weak state American civil religion aids communal solidarity, but claims to a
more central identity or moral focus would be unfortunate. This analysis simply
fails to acknowledge the religious dominance ofU.S. nationalism, which justifies
and explains the death of sacrificial believers in a way that sectarian faith has not
been permitted for two centuries. Americans rightly cherish their country's
avoidance of the corrosive sectarian strife that convulsed Europe from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. The so-called wall of separation between state and
religious authority in the U.S.-a phrase that both stands for and conceals the
subordination of sectarian to national religion--secured internal peace through
the triumph of national religion. Church and state separation is an article of faith
in the democratic catechism and a source ofnational pride.
Rod Hart argues that the social contract between secular and religious authority is two-pronged. Sectarian religion provides a rhetoric of moral legitimacy,
and the state provides enforcement. David Ingle and I argue that both the rhetoric
of civil religion and its actions in the strong sense described here can be at least
as usefully understood within a framework of religious nationalism. Denominational religion must bow to this authority in order to exist in the contemporary
United States. Resistance by sectarian faiths within the national community is
thus regarded with alarm. Witness the fate of David Koresh, who competed for
killing authority with the nation. This is what denominational religion may not
do. The fundamental elements of nationalism-i"hetoric and action--may point
less to the covenant between separate social domains that Hart argues for than to
an integrated national system that makes patriotic sacrifice its religious focus.
That said, Rod Hart surely has a good part of the analysis of civil religion
right. He convincingly argues that inferences from presidential rhetoric alone,
from which Bellah and his colleagues made the case for civil religion, are evidentially inadequate. He calls for expanding the range of evidence within which civil
religious talk and observance could be located. But he perhaps overlooks the
limitless range of patriotic talk, rituals, and practices in which Americans daily
ground and rehearse the claims of civil religion. To complicate Bellah's account
of civil religion, Hart focuses on the indifference and hostility that are part of the
social response to it and to all religion. And by limiting his observations largely
to the comments of ecclesiastics competing with civil religion for the loyalty of
believers, he leaves others to explore the implications ofhis insight that civil religion is society-encompassing, not simply a debate among presidents and clergymen. He discerns the elements of the settlement between civil and ecclesiastic
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authorities, the one supplying the muscle of nationalism, the other offering goalong rhetoric-though I believe the rich rhetoric of patriotism is far more central. It is found in ceremonies and talk about the Fourth of July, in presidential
elections, in rituals of war and every other national ceremony. It flourishes in
mediated representations of American life including news, films, politics, advertising, and every form ofpopular culture. In this elaborated account of civil religion, 'enforcement' emerges not as a crude despiritualized violence, but as the
sacralized focus of a grandly articulated system of religious meaning in which
denominational religion takes second place. Civil religion and denominational
religion are not, in this view, equal partners uneasily at peace with one another.
Denominational religion tells us about civil religion only indirectly.
To exemplify the way in which nationalism triumphs over sectarian claims, I
choose Hart's discussion of the Rev. Billy Graham's views about Dwight Eisenhower. As commander of World War IT Allied troops in Europe and twice president, Eisenhower stands as one of the revered holy fathers of 2Oth-centwy U.S.
civil religion. In a recurring homily ofthe faith, citizens are reminded ofhis observation that government should be founded in religion, and he didn't care what religion it was. 6 As Hart has it, Graham, a lifelong ambassador from denominational to
national religion, made much of the fact that only after Eisenhower became president did he join a church and receive baptism. But Graham misunderstood Eisenhower's gestures. In these acts the nation's highest religious officer cultivated diplomatic relations with persisting native faiths. The foundation ofEisenhower's civil
devotion had been laid during his initiation as a West Point acolyte. He described
this experience with the fervor ofthe spiritually transformed:
My first day at West Point-June 14, 1911-had been rough.
My classmates and I had been barked at and ordered by upperclassmen to do all sorts ofridiculous chores, on the double.
All 285 ofus were weary and resentful.
Towards evening, however, we assembled outdoors and,
with the American flag floating majestically above us, were
sworn in as cadets of the United States Military Academy. It
was an impressive ceremony. As I looked up at our national
colors and swore my allegiance, I realized humbly that now I
belonged to the flag. It is a moment I have never forgotten. 7
Religion is not rhetoric. A religion constituted by rhetoric alone, as Hart argues in The Political Pulpit, doesn't do anything.8 But U.S. civil religion does do
things. It kills. It commands sacrifice. It transforms infants, non-believers, and
converts from other national faiths into Americans. It even mobilizes churches,
synagogues, and mosques. It offers patriotic instruction in efficacious spells and
rituals that believers will put to work when crisis comes. This is why Eisenhower
could say that government should be founded in religion and never mind which
one. He believed that in the moment of group truth, all citizens would gather
under the single tent of American sacrificial authority. The moral and physical
continuation ofthe nation would depend on it.
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